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IN  RECENT  YEARS  I have become more perplexed  and more skeptical 
about  the use of monetary  policy  as a tool for very  short-run  stabilization. 
At present  the profession  has one body of analysis  that relies upon an 
elaborated  Keynesian  approach  to outline the link between  changes  in 
monetary  policy and changes  in real economic  activity.  This linkage  runs 
from  open  market  operations  to bank  reserves  and  then  through  the money 
supply  and other  factors  to short-term  interest  rates.  Movements  in short- 
term  rates  are  translated  into changes  in long-term  rates  through  a variety 
of channels.  Long-term  rates in turn provide  the link to business  invest- 
ment,  the stock  market,  consumption,  and homebuilding. 
This process  has been described  in great detail in models such as the 
FRB-MIT-Penn  model. But one must qualify  the results  of these models 
by noting  that the lags are very  long and that many  of the features  of the 
outcome  are very uncertain.  The estimates  of the response  elasticities  are 
subject  to a wide range  of disagreement.  Some of the links, such as those 
involving  the stock  market,  involve  a great  deal  of uncertainty  and  possible 
interaction  with other  factors.  These  models  do not lend much appeal  to 
the notion of using  monetary  policy for precise  short-run  guidance. 
An alternative  approach  attempts  to go directly  from some monetary 
aggregate  to economic  activity,  without  specifying  the details  of the link- 
ages. This approach  has been illustrated  in many papers  in recent  years. 
While  the results  are consistent  with those of the structural  models in a 
general  sense,  I am skeptical  about  the more  detailed  implications.  In par- 
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ticular,  it is difficult  to understand  why  a substantial  portion  of the impact 
of monetary  policy should be reflected  in consumer  services,  as this ap- 
proach  turns  out to imply.  Such  models  are  rather  weak  reeds  to lean  on in 
the conduct  of monetary  policy. 
I conclude  that  ambitious  goals  for achieving  short-run  stabilization  with 
monetary  policy  cannot  be met. Instead,  more  emphasis  should  be placed 
on avoiding  the extremes.  In that context,  an approach  that relies  on the 
monetary  aggregates  can best  be  justified,  when  applied  with  some  caution, 
as a type of automatic  stabilizer.  If one is concerned  about the economy 
running  away in either direction,  upper and lower limits on monetary 
growth-but not too firm  limits-provide some automatic  defense  against 
other forces that might push the economy either strongly upward or 
strongly  downward. 
The Recent  Conduct  of Policy 
Drawing  on these observations  about  the general  role of monetary  pol- 
icy, I shall outline  my interpretation  of the way in which  monetary  policy 
has been conducted  recently  in terms  of open market  operations.  I shall 
then offer  some tentative  suggestions  for a slightly  better  method  of con- 
ducting policy, and finally, I shall apply those remarks  to the current 
situation. 
From my reading  and conversations  about the conduct of monetary 
policy in the past two or three years,  my impression  is that the Federal 
Reserve  begins  policy  planning  each  period  with an attitude  of wanting  to 
be restrictive-or expansionary,  as the case may be-to  a certain  degree. 
The currently  available  statistics  on monetary  aggregates  and  interest  rates 
are evaluated  and interpreted  relative  to this general  attitude.  Second,  in 
each period  the policy  makers  study  a staff  projection  reflecting  a money- 
demand  function that relates  the prospective  growth of money for the 
weeks  ahead  to alternative  levels  of some  interest  rate  in the  money  market. 
A choice has to be made of the target  rate of increase  in the monetary 
aggregate  for the next short  period.  My impression  is that the baseline  fig- 
ure has been about 6 percent  annual  growth,  if the monetary  aggregate  is 
interpreted  as the narrowly  defined  money  supply  (Mi). If the staff  projec- 
tion implies  that a change  in interest  rates  would  be required  to hold that 
growth  close to 6 percent,  the Federal  Open  Market  Committee  makes  a 510  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
judgment  that is related  to its desire to be either restrictive  or expan- 
sionary.  If the mood is expansionary,  the FOMC  will resist  any  tendencies 
for interest  rates  to rise  by letting  money  grow  faster.  If it is restrictive,  it 
will  let interest  rates  go up in order  to stay  close  to the baseline  growth  rate 
for the monetary  aggregate.  How much of an interest  rate rise it will 
accept  depends  partly  on how much  of a shift is implied  by the staff  fore- 
cast and partly  on how restrictive  it desires  to be. 
A second  type of decision  is required  when  the trading  desk  encounters 
a shift  in the relationship  between  interest  rates  and  the  monetary  aggregate 
that was not anticipated  by the staff projection.  A new, very short-run, 
decision  may be made;  again,  that involves  a compromise.  If the surprise 
is on the up side, the choice is between  letting the aggregates  get bigger 
than the FOMC  had initially  intended  and letting  rates  go higher. 
This  policy-making  process  can  produce  peculiar  results.  In some  periods 
when policy is meant  to be restrictive,  the monetary  aggregate  may grow 
rapidly.  That is an understandable  outcome,  stemming  from substantial 
upward  shifts  in the demand  function  for money and a consequent  com- 
promise  between  raising  interest  rates  sharply  and permitting  rapid  mone- 
tary growth.  But more paradoxical  results  emerge  when shifts in the de- 
mand for money are opposite in direction  to the thrust of the general 
cyclical  movement  of the economy.  For example,  the demand  for money 
sometimes  shifts down in the short run when the economy  is expanding 
rapidly  and  the FOMC  is trying  to be restrictive.  The  committee  must  then 
compromise.  If it holds  the growth  aggregates  up, it must  let interest  rates 
fall-in  spite  of its desire  to be restrictive.  To avoid  a drop  in interest  rates, 
it would have to accept very low rates of growth in the aggregates.  A 
strange  timing  of changes  in open market  policy  has occasionally  resulted 
from  the compromise  actually  adopted  in the face of this type of conflict. 
In the fall of 1972,  for example,  a policy  based  on interest  rates  might  have 
resulted  in an earlier  upturn  in rates  and a smaller  growth  in the monetary 
aggregates  than in fact took place. But the devotion  to the aggregates  in 
those  peculiar  circumstances  delayed  the application  of real  restraint.  Even 
if one wishes  to place some weight  on the monetary  aggregates,  I cannot 
see the sense  of putting  such great  emphasis  on very  short-run  month-to- 
month movements  as to push policy in a direction  contrary  to the basic 
objective-such as letting interest  rates fall when the intention  is to be 
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An Alternative  Approach 
I suggest  a somewhat  different  method  of making  the compromise  be- 
tween  aggregates  and  interest  rates.  Consider  monetary  policy  decisions  in 
three  possible  states  of the economy.  One is a state  in which  there  is little 
concern  that  the economy  will run  away  in either  direction.  In that state,  a 
forecast  of activity  based  on a continuation  of current  interest  rates  would 
not be sharply  different  from a reasonable  target  growth  path, and would 
not reveal  strong  cumulative  forces  that  could  take  hold  in either  direction. 
I would  opt in this case essentially  for an interest  rate  approach  to mone- 
tary policy-that  is, let the monetary  aggregates  fall where  they may in 
response  to wiggles  and  jiggles  in the demand  for money. 
The second  state  is one in which  excessive  growth  in demand  is a serious 
threat.  Such  a case of possible  boom poses a greater  need  for a policy  that 
will  provide  some  automatic  stabilization  against  upward  thrusts  in demand 
and less concern  about  a rather  sudden  upward  jolt in interest  rates.  Here 
some ceiling  rate of growth  for the monetary  aggregates  might  be one de- 
sirable  element  of policy  in an effort  to contain  the economy.  If, however, 
a boom  has  really  started,  such  a governor  may  not supply  enough  restraint. 
To provide  a further  stopper,  it may be desirable  to produce  a rather  sud- 
den  jump in interest  rates-say, by a major  rise in the discount  rate rein- 
forced  by an upward  push  on the federal  funds  rate. Once  that rate  move- 
ment is accomplished,  the strategy  based on ceiling  growth  of monetary 
aggregates  would  be applied. 
The  third  state,  in which  the  major  concern  is a recession,  is the opposite 
of the second.  Some  minimum  growth  rate of money  can be a useful  auto- 
matic  stabilizer  to bolster  demand.  If the situation  is very  serious,  it would 
be appropriate  to reduce  interest  rates  to a lower  level  rather  suddenly  and 
then  adopt  a floor  on the rate  of growth  of the money  supply  or some  other 
monetary  aggregate. 
In summary,  a floor  or ceiling  growth  rate  for the monetary  aggregate  is 
a reasonable  approach  when the risks are one-sided  and compelling  evi- 
dence  exists for monetary  policy to be either  expansionary  or restrictive. 
But in the mid-range  of the first  state,  a devotion  to short-term  stability  in 
the monetary  aggregates  can lead to frequent  and unjustified  reversals  of 
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The Current  Situation 
I would  place  the current  economic  situation  in the first  class of cases. 
The United States  is no longer  in the second  state:  there  is little prospect 
that  the economy  will  renew  its spurt.  Nor is it in the third  state,  in which  a 
weak  outlook  would  call for drastic  policy  changes.  Most forecasters  see a 
"welcome  slowdown"  with  real  growth  close  to 4 percent  for the latter  half 
of 1973,  graduating  down  to lower  figures  in the first  half of 1974.  Beyond 
that,  the picture  is less clear,  but some  foresee  an improvement  later  in the 
year.  Thus,  the profession  is projecting  growth  rates  below  the rate of ex- 
pansion  of potential  output,  but still  positive.  These  forecasts  assume  some 
easing of monetary  policy, and a moderate  rise in government  expendi- 
tures.  The strength  comes  from  plant  and  equipment  and  inventory  invest- 
ment,  while  the weakness  lies in homebuilding  and a projected  rise  in per- 
sonal saving  rates.  As always,  these forecasts  are subject  to major  errors, 
but, at present,  the uncertainties  look fairly  symmetrical  to me. 
In this situation  the correct  posture  for monetary  policy will depend  a 
good deal on the policy maker's  attitude  toward  taking  risks  on inflation 
versus  taking  risks  on unemployment.  On the inflation  side,  increased  slack 
of labor markets  and falling corporate  profits should provide restraint 
against  any  large  acceleration  of wage  settlements  in the face of strong  and 
inevitable  cost-push  forces generated  by the recent  jump in the cost of 
living.  Some decline  in the prices  of nonfood  raw  materials  can be antici- 
pated as a result of the slowdown.  Thus, the standard  forecast  projects 
modest improvement  rather  than continued  deterioration  in the perfor- 
mance  of prices.  A major  upside  surprise  in real growth  could  jeopardize 
that improvement,  while a major  downside  surprise  would  involve  a high 
cost to get a little more  relief  from  inflation.  My interpretation  is that this 
outlook  does  not  justify  an attempt  to conduct  policy  so as to create  a new 
and  substantially  lower  or  higher  path  of aggregate  demand.  Rather,  it calls 
for a policy  strategy  to help  validate  the forecasts,  preserving  the flexibility 
to jump either  way in the event of major  unanticipated  developments. 
Since  I do not see an explosive  situation  or key role for automatic  stabi- 
lization,  I would  focus  on interest  rates.  I would  aim  at a gradual  decline  in 
the federal  funds  rate,  perhaps  starting  to drop  it 50 basis  points  per  month 
and  planning  for a somewhat  more  rapid  drop  after  a while  unless  contrary 
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gregates  and aim at 6 percent  as a tentative  target  for short-term  interest 
rates  early  in the spring  of 1974. 
Discussion 
SEVERAL  OF THE participants  commented  on the choice of interest  rates 
versus  monetary  aggregates  as the proximate  target  of monetary  policy. 
William  Poole disagreed  with Duesenberry  about the risks of a policy 
oriented  toward  interest  rates  in the months  ahead;  he felt that such  a pol- 
icy might  bring  interest  rates  down  less rapidly  than one conducted  by an 
aggregate  target  if, in fact, the economy should soften significantly  and 
fairly  prompt  reductions  in interest  rates  became  appropriate.  On the other 
hand,  if the demand  for money  should  be surprisingly  intense  for a while, 
Duesenberry's  proposal  of a gradual  reduction  in interest  rates  could gen- 
erate very rapid monetary  growth,  and Poole suspected  that that might 
generate  a political  backlash  toward  much tighter  money thereafter.  Be- 
cause  the growth  of the money  stock had exceeded  the intentions  and ex- 
pectations  of the policy  makers  during  the spring,  he felt there  would  not 
be much  tolerance  for rapid  money  growth  in the near  future. 
William  Gibson  echoed  Poole's  concerns  about  policies  oriented  toward 
interest  rates.  He suggested  that Duesenberry's  own desired  minimization 
of destabilizing  monetary  policy stances would be more likely to  be 
achieved  through  a policy of maintaining  moderate  growth  in the mone- 
tary  aggregates.  Barry  Bosworth  felt, on the other  hand,  that  the monetary 
aggregates  should  be used only as short-run  indicators,  primarily  as addi- 
tional evidence  on the nature and significance  of changes  in economic 
activity.  He stressed  that, over  the longer  run,  the policy  maker  should  be 
focusing  on changes  in GNP, prices,  and employment,  rather  than on any 
of the instruments  of policy.  He noted  that exclusive  concern  with  interest 
rates  would  not take account  of the impact  of changes  in financial  policies 
affecting  mortgages,  and that these could have a major  effect  in either  re- 
inforcing  or offsetting  the actions  of the Federal  Reserve. 
A number  of participants  emphasized  the prospect  of a sizable  decline  in 
homebuilding  during  the  coming  year,  possibly  large  enough  to swamp  pro- 
spective  real gains  in plant and equipment  spending  and in inventory  in- 
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cushioned  by the previous  commitments  of mortgage  lenders  contracted 
before  interest  rates  rose so sharply.  Hence,  the severity  of the homebuild- 
ing decline  can probably  be gauged  accurately  only when the backlog  of 
such  commitments  runs  out, as it will in a few months. 
Charles  Holt questioned  the completeness  of Duesenberry's  three-state 
model of monetary  policy. Duesenberry  agreed  that the world  had more 
continuity  than that categorization  implied;  he noted  that he had actually 
designated  five  different  states,  including  his stopper  on both  the  restrictive 
and expansionary  sides. 
Lawrence  Klein pointed out that, while real growth  has not deviated 
significantly  from  the rate  predicted  by most  economists  at the end of 1972, 
the inflation  rate  has vastly  exceeded  predictions.  He raised  the question  of 
how both the targets  for economic  activity  and the instruments  of mone- 
tary policy should  be adjusted  when such a surprise  is revealed.  Duesen- 
berry  felt that  his proposed  ceiling  growth  rate  on money  might  help  under 
those  circumstances.  But  he stressed  that,  in his  judgment,  the unique  kind 
of inflation  experienced  in 1973  would  not justify  a significant  lowering  of 
targets  for real  economic  activity.  Joseph  Pechman  noted  that,  nonetheless, 
Duesenberry's  own strategy  essentially  accepted  a fairly  significant  rise in 
unemployment  to rates  higher  than  anyone  would  previously  have  espoused 
as a norm  for prosperity. 